The Grenfell Tower fire left behind 72 people dead in one of the worst tragedies in the history of modern Britain. Feelings of despair turned to anger in the days following the fire, when serious problems arose with the security of the building. Tuesday marks the fifth anniversary of the tragedy and a wide-ranging public inquiry into the disaster is set to be completed next month as activists continue to fight for justice. The Metropolitan Police are investigating the fire, but can not prosecute, such as negligent homicide, until the public investigation is completed. Here, we take a look at the main things we have learned in research so far. The investment company was aware of the risk of fire The reason the fire was able to spread so quickly to the 24-storey block was because it was covered with flammable lining during the renovation project that took place between 2012 and 2016. The investment was provided by a company called Arconic, whose former UK sales manager admitted in a February 2021 investigation that he knew the investment could burn out, but did not warn customers. Debbie French, who was sales manager between 2007 and 2014, said the company’s more flammable options were cheaper and therefore sold as part of a buying strategy to increase the likelihood of securing contracts. Image: The lower floors of the Grenfell Tower after the fire show investment damaged by fire. Photo: AP It was not just the investment that burned In September 2020, the investigation showed that flammable materials had been packed around the new windows during the renovation which “contributed to the speed with which the fire spread from the apartment … to a high-rise outdoor fire”. It turned out that Mark Dixon, who ran SD Plastering, the subcontractor who installed the hardware, had complained that his work was causing him “headaches” and had to “find ways to make it easier and faster.” The gaps around the windows were supposed to be filled with unburned Rockwool insulation fiber. However, SD Plastering used flammable Celotex foam boards. The insulation manufacturer cheated the fire safety test There were two types of flammable plastic foam insulation used outside the Grenfell Tower. In November 2020, a public inquiry heard that Celotex, which did most of the insulation, added a non-combustible material to its product to ensure that it would pass a fire safety test in 2014. He hid the use of the material from the fire test report, the official certification bodies and even the sales staff of the company. The material also did not mention the marketing of the product that was advertised as “suitable for use” in high-rise buildings. Meanwhile, the second company to provide insulation was Kingspan, which sold its products for use in high-rise buildings without a relevant large-scale fire test. Its insulation passed a test in 2005, but Kingspan changed the product a year later. The investigation heard that the products tested then turned into “raging hell”, but Kingspan continued to sell the insulation using the 2005 test on the old material. Image: Condolence messages appear in caches near Grenfell Tower after tragedy Poor construction The renovation project at Grenfell Tower was undermined by “shockingly poor construction”, the survey heard in July 2020. Fire barriers in the cladding system were placed upside down and incorrectly. Some were cut roughly and left empty. The building inspector had no relevant experience The local building inspector in charge of inspecting the renovation of Grenfell Tower had no previous experience with roofing work on an occupied high-rise apartment building, according to the September 2020 survey. John Hoban described himself as “devastated” by the disaster and admitted to making “serious failures” in his work. He did not notice that no cavity dams had been designed around the windows to stop the flames from spreading to the outside wall. Mr. Hoban also failed to acknowledge that building cladding materials were not suitable for use together in high-rise buildings. Firefighters were not prepared Firefighters who monitored the fire had no training on how to best fight an investment fire, according to a 2019 survey. A report released after the first phase of the investigation found that there was a lack of training on how to “recognize the need for evacuation or how to organize” and “relatively inferior” case managers could not change strategy. Sir Martin Moore-Bick, the head of the investigation, also criticized the London Fire Department for the way it implemented a “stay put” strategy, where firefighters and 999 pilots told residents to stay in their apartments for almost two hours after the fire broke out. The strategy was canceled at 2:47 a.m., with Sir Martin saying lives would have been saved if the advice had ended about an hour earlier. Read more: Nearly 1,500 children treated for trauma due to disaster Girl who lost five family members in disaster recounts trauma The “chaotic” response of the Council made things worse, an investigation is heard Use the Chrome browser for a more accessible video player 3:18 “I miss everything about the Grenfell Tower” Government fails to act on fire warnings at Lakanal House in 2009 In May 2021, the investigation heard the head of housing at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, the council to which Grenfell Tower belongs, did not follow the recommendations made in the medical examiner’s report on a fire in Camberwell, south-east London. in 2009. Six people were killed and at least 10 were injured in what became known as the Lakanal House fire. The medical examiner’s document included appeals to the owners to ensure that they had implemented evacuation strategies. He also called on the owners to ensure that staff members involved in the procurement of renovation works were adequately trained in understanding the fire protection properties of the materials used.
