Now, as they support Ukraine in its war with Russia, Western powers are once again tempted to define victory as non-defeat. The Ukrainians are worried that they will be given enough to keep fighting – but not enough to defeat Russia. This is a disturbing prospect at a time when their cities are being destroyed and the Ukrainian army is losing hundreds of men a day as it struggles to stop the Russian advance. A recent article by President Joe Biden defined America’s main goal as maintaining a free and independent Ukraine. German Chancellor Olaf Solz has often said that Russia should not win – but he never said that Ukraine should win. A spokesman for Emanuel Macron said on condition of anonymity that France wanted Ukraine to win, but the president himself had not yet said so. Instead, Boris Johnson, the British prime minister, simply said that “Ukraine must win.” And Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaya Callas said: “Victory must be the goal and not a peace agreement.” The difference between those who call for Ukraine’s victory and those who confine themselves to saying that Russia should not win is much more than an issue. It dictates crucial decisions about the type of weapons that will be provided to Ukraine – and whether and when it will push for a peaceful settlement. Estonia’s rejection of “a peace agreement” runs counter to Biden’s stated goal of putting Ukraine “in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table.” Behind these views is a difference in perception of threat. Those who see the greatest danger as Russian imperialism are ready to demand the victory of Ukraine. This camp includes Poland, Britain, the Baltic States and Finland. Those who are most concerned about the war between Russia and the West will only talk about Moscow not winning. They fear that pushing for an absolute victory for Ukraine could lead to an immediate confrontation between Russia and the West or the use of Russian nuclear weapons. France and Germany are in this camp. The US, for the most part, is somewhere in the middle – trying to balance its response to both threats, as it provides most of its military assistance to Ukraine. The prevailing view in the Biden government is that, having become very concerned about the nuclear conflict at the beginning of the war, the West now risks very little concern. Russian military dogma allows the use of nuclear weapons in case of existential threat to the nation. Senior US officials believe it is possible that Russian leader Vladimir Putin could see a humiliating defeat in Ukraine represent such an existential threat. This creates a paradoxical situation – in which the better Ukraine does on the battlefield, the more dangerous the situation becomes. These concerns are drawing real attention to US policy and are the reason why Washington has decided to limit the range of new missiles it supplies to Ukraine. The Americans decided not to send an artillery that could hit Russia well because that could look very much like a direct US attack. (Meanwhile, the delivery of heavy weapons from Germany continues to be delayed.) All of this is a source of deep frustration for those in the Western alliance who believe that the greatest danger is Russian imperialism – not Russian defeat. They point to Putin’s recent statements, in which he was anointed heir to the throne of Peter the Great, for the recapture – as he put it – and the expansion of Russian territory. This school of thought rejects the idea that Putin will never become nuclear – arguing that the Russian leader has always shown a strong instinct for self-preservation. They believe that the only way to put an end to the Russian imperial threat is to humiliate Putin. This leads to calls for much more aggressive military moves – such as providing Kyiv with the means to sink the Russian fleet that is currently blocking Ukrainian ports. Aware of the need to maintain Western unity, America and its allies have come up with some verbal formulas that everyone can agree on. Everyone, including Scholz and Macron, agrees that no peace deal will be imposed on Ukraine. But Ukraine is concerned that they will be forced, de facto, to cede territory because they will not be given strong enough weapons to prevent Russia from advancing on the battlefield. Much will depend on the impact of the new artillery systems promised to Ukraine in the coming weeks. Despite their underlying divisions, most Western governments seem to believe that if Ukraine could force Russia to return to where its armed forces began on February 24, before the invasion, then that would provide the basis for serious negotiations. Unfortunately, however, there is no guarantee that Ukraine can achieve this kind of victory – or that either side will stop fighting if the February 24 lines are reached. In Ukraine, as in Vietnam, the definition of victory is dangerously elusive and the result can be a long, brutal war of attrition. [email protected]
